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PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE ENGLISH IMPLIED
TERMS BILL: TRANSATLANTIC VARIATIONS ON
A THEME
I. Introduction
The action of breach of warranty arose under the general category of Case
for deceit without scienter.' Gradually, as liability was extended to encompass
parties to express agreements who performed their undertakings badly, the form
,of Assumpsit emerged as distinct from Case. Assumpsit offered distinct proce-
dural advantages. Providing an express agreement existed, it allowed enforce-
ment of parol contracts and avoided the wager of law, which could be invoked
in an action on Debt. After proof of an express promise to pay the contractual
"debt" was made unnecessary, the action of Indebitatus Assumpsit supplanted
Debt as the vehicle for enforcement of contracts; and, a fortiori, it supplanted
Debt as the chief means of recovering for breach of warranty.2 The delictual
character of warranty theory, however, had never been entirely forgotten,3 and
was to reappear during the course of the American struggle with the privity
doctrine.
Perhaps it is no overgeneralization to observe, borrowing Maitland's meta-
phor, that the action of Indebitatus Assumpsit-with its concomitant contrac-
tual flavor-rules English products liability theory today, while the American
theory owes allegiance to Case. Although American courts had for some time
been more willing to circumvent the privity requirement than the English, the
parting of the ways occurred about ten years ago with the imposition by Ameri-
can courts of strict liability "in tort" for defective products. British law now
faces roughly the same problems with warranty theory as confronted American
courts in the early 1960's and which led to the American adoption of a strict
liability rule; chief among these problems are privity and exemption clauses.
Efforts are under way to deal with these problems in both the short and the long
run.
The "citadel" of English privity is not yet under heavy attack, but there is
a general feeling abroad that a remedy must be fashioned which will allow both
recovery by third parties not in privity with the seller, supplier, or manufacturer
of a defective product, and a means of imposing liability directly on the supplier
or manufacturer which will be superior to the negligence method now employed.
Such a remedy can be expected to emerge from the interface of tort and con-
tract. To this end the Lord High Chancellor, Lord Hailsham of Saint Maryle-
bone, has authorized the formation of a Law Commissions' Working Party to
study the remedies available for loss caused by defective products and to recom-
mend any changes deemed necessary.
More immediately, a Working Party was established by the English and
1 See generally F. W. MAiTLAND, THRF FORMS OF AcToN AT COMMON LAW 68-70
(1963); Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 53 (1888).
2 Eventually a contract action was held to lie for breach of warranty. Stuart v. Wilkins,
1 Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778).
3 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TnE LAw OF TORTS § 97 (4th ed. 1971).
185
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Scottish Law Commissions to focus on the problem of disclaimers of liability.
The Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Bill' is the direct product of this Work-
ing Party, whose First Report was issued in July, 1969. 5 The Bill represents a
step forward toward the provision of an adequate remedy for aggrieved con-
sumers, but it is a short step. It is directed towards contracts for sale and in-
volves no reformulation of the means of recovery. It does redefine the implied
conditions under the Act, and it imposes a prohibition on disclaimers of liability
for breach of implied condition in consumer sales and a limited prohibition in
business sales. The Bill is best viewed against the background of the Sale of
Goods Act, 18936 (which it is intended to amend and supplement) and the
Act's judicial interpretation.
II. The Sale of Goods Act, 1893
The Sale of Goods Act is a codifying statute intended to be largely declara-
tory of the common law of sales as it stood in 1893. The Act did, however, g6
further in certain areas than the cases which preceded it, notably in its restric-
tion of the caveat emptor doctrine by the declaration of certain implied con-
ditions.'
Moreover, the 1893 Act "codified" a common law which was itself in a
period of transition from the laissez-faire environment of the nineteenth century's
untrammeled capitalism to one more congenial to the private consumer's in-
terests.' The resultant theoretical schizophrenia produced sections on implied
terms which are broader than the common law of 1893 but also a section per-
mitting contractual evasion of liability for their breach. These sections should
be examined in some detail.
A. "Terns" Under the Act
Terms under the 1893 Act can be either express or implied; the category
"terms" encompasses both "conditions" and "warranties." Express terms are
those agreed to in so many words by the parties; implied terms are prescribed
by §§ 12-15 of the 1893 Act or are "annexed by the usage of trade" under
§ 14(3). There is no statutory definition of "condition" but it appears from
§ 11 ( 1 ) (b) that breach of condition gives rise to a right of repudiation. It thus
4 Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Bill (1972; printing of 5 February 1973) (hereinafter
cited as "Bill" or "Implied Terms Bill").
5 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission (Law Com. No. 24, Scot. Law
Com. No. 12), Exemption Clauses in Contracts, First Report: Amendments to the Sale of
Goods Act 1893, 24 July 1969.
6 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71 '(hereinafter cited as "1893 Act"). See generally P. ATIYAH, THE
SALE OF GOODS (4th ed. 1971); M. CHALMERS, SALE OF GOODS AcT, 1893 (16th ed. 1971);
LoRD CHIORLEY AND 0. GILES, SLATER'S MERCANTILE LAW (16th ed. 1972).
7 1893 Act §§ 12-15. Although the received method of interpreting declaratory statutes
has been to refer first to the language of the statute itself and then to extrastatutory considera-
tions if necessary, see Lord Herschell's speech in Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros., [1891]
A.C. 107, 144, it appears that, at least with regard to the terms implied by the 1893 Act, the
court may refuse to apply the letter of the statute if it violates the parties' reasonable intent.
See Lord Diplock's speech in Ashingon Piggeries, Ltd. v. Christopher Hill, Ltd., [1971] 1 All
E.R. 847, 882.
8 R. LowE, SALE OF GOODS AND HmE-PuRcHIASE 12 (2d ed. 1972).
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has been inferred that "a condition is a term which, without being the funda-
mental obligation imposed by the contract, is still of such vital importance that
it goes to the root of the transaction."9 "Warranties," on the other hand, are
expressly defined in § 62 as agreements "with reference to goods which are the
subject of a contract for sale, but collateral to the main purpose of that contract,
the breach of which gives rise to a claim for damages, but not a right to reject
the goods and treat the contract as repudiated." There is no distinct conceptual
boundary between conditions and warranties under the Act. The implied terms
delineated in §§ 12-15, however, with the exception of the implied warranties
of quiet possession and freedom from encumbrance prescribed in §§ 12(2) and
12(3), are referred to as "conditions" and have been interpreted as such. It
is thus incorrect to speak in the language of the Uniform Commercial Code
and refer to the implied terms of merchantability and fitness for purpose as
"warranties"; they are, stricto sensu, conditions. The distinction becomes espe-
cially meaningful in the context of the effect of exemption clauses.
B. The Implied Conditions and Their Modification Under the Bill
The 1893 Act imposes implied conditions of capacity to sell (§ 12), of
correspondence with the description in a "sale by description" (§ 13), of fitness
for purpose and merchantable quality (§ 14), and of correspondence and oppor-
tunity to inspect in a "sale by sample" (§ 15)." The Law Commissions exam-
ined each of these conditions and recommended changes to §§ 12, 13, and 14;
the most substantial changes recommended affected § 14. The Bill rewrites
§ 12 and § 14 and appends a clause to § 13. Each condition in the Act should
be scrutinized and placed in apposition to the Bill clauses which modify it.
1. Section 12:" In a contract for sale of goods the passing of the property
is of fundamental importance. Section 12 has been invoked to provide a wide
umbrella of protection for the buyer who purchases from a seller who has no
right to sell. In Rowland v. Divall,"2 for example, the plaintiff bought an auto-
mobile from defendant and used it for four months before discovering that it
had been stolen. The defendant, who had bought the car in good faith, con-
tended that (1) the plaintiff had "accepted" the car under § 11(1) (c) of the
Act '3 and thus could sue for damages only, and (2) that allowance should be
made for the four months' usage. The Court of Appeal held that the buyer
9 ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 32.
10 See generally ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 43 et seq.; Low., supra note 8, at 66 et seq.;
Davies, Merchantability and Fitness for Purpose: Implied Conditions of the Sale of Goods Act,
1893, 85 L.Q.R. 74 (1969); Yates, Merchantable Quality and Consumer Protection, 123 N.w
L.J. 59 (1973).
11 § 12: In a contract of sale, unless the circumstances of the contract are such as to show
a different intention, there is -
(1) An implied condition on the part of the seller that in the case of a sale he has a right
to sell the goods, and that in the case of an agreement to sell he will have a right to sell the
goods at the time when the property is to pass:
(2) An implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy quiet possession of the goods:
(3) An implied warranty that the goods shall be free from any charge or encumbrance in
favour of any third party, not declared or known to the buyer before or at the time when the
contract is made.
12 [1923] 2 K.B. 500.
13 § 11 "(1) (c) :Where a contract of sale is not severable, and the buyer has accepted the
goods, or part thereof, or where the contract is for specific goods, the property in which has
NOTES
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could recover the full price, without credit for use, on the grounds of total failure
of consideration-the buyer had received no property in the goods.' 4
The opening words of § 12-"unless the circumstances of the contract are
such as to show a different intention"--seem to indicate, however, that the buyer
may take subject to a possibly defective title depending on the circumstances
of the transaction. More importantly, § 5515 can be relied upon to sanction a
disclaimer of liability.
The Commissions appreciated the hardship worked by the rule in Rowland
v. Divall but felt that a change which would allow the buyer to recover only
for his actual loss (giving allowance for his use of the goods), while desirable,
should nevertheless await a study of the rules relating to the law of restitution.'
The Bill does, however, deal with the problem of exclusion clauses limiting the
conditions and warranties under § 12. Under the Bill exclusion or variation
of these terms is possible only when it is clear that the seller purports to sell only
a limited title. Even when the seller does make this clear, the warranties of quiet
possession and freedom from encumbrance cannot be entirely excluded.'7 Thus,.
passed to the buyer, the breach of any condition to be fulfilled by the seller can only be treated
as a breach of warranty, and not as a ground for rejecting the goods and treating the contract
as repudiated, unless there be a term of the contract, express or implied, to that effect.
14 Accord: Niblett v. Confectioners Materials Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 387, in which the seller
was held to have breached § 12 (1) even though he did indeed have power to transfer title;
Butterworth v. Kingsway Motors, Ltd., [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1286, in which defendant-seller
remedied the defect in title after plaintiff-buyer gave notice of rejection - nearly a year after
purchase - and plaintiff was allowed to recover the purchase price (netting a profit of £475).
But see Patten v. Thomas Motors Pty., Ltd., [1965] N.S.W.R. 1457, limiting the effect of the
buyer's rejection, and the criticisms of Rowland in Law Reform Committee, Twelfth Report,
Cnrnd. No. 2958, para. 36 (1966), and ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 47.
15 § 55: Where any right, duty, or liability would arise under a contract of sale by implica-
tion of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing
between the parties, or by usage, if the usage be such as to bind both parties to the contract.
16 Report, supra note 5, at 5.
17 Clause 1: For section 12 of the principal Act (implied conditions as to title, and implied
warranties as to quiet possession and freedom from encumbrances) there shall be substituted
the following section:-
12.-(1) In every contract of sale, other than one to which subsection (2) of this
section applies, there is-
(a) an implied condition on the part of the seller that in the case of a sale, he
has a right to sell the goods, and in the case of an agreement to sell, he will have a
right to sell the goods at the time when the property is to pass; and
(b) an implied warranty that the goods are free, and will remain free until the
time when the property is to pass, from any charge or encumbrance not disclosed or
known to the buyer before the contract is made and that the buyer will enjoy quiet
possession of the goods except so far as it may be disturbed by the owner or other
person entitled to the benefit of any charge or encumbrance so disclosed or known.
(2) In a contract of sale in the case of which there appears from the contract
or is to be inferred from the circumstances of the contract an intention that the seller
should transfer only such title as he or a third person may have, there is -
(a) an implied warranty that all charges or encumbrances known to the seller
and not known to the buyer have been disclosed to the buyer before the contract is
made; and
(b) an implied warranty that neither-
(i) the seller; nor
'(ii) in a case where the parties to the contract intend that the seller
should transfer only such title as a third person may have, that person; nor
(iii) anyone claiming through or under the seller or that third person other-
wise than under a charge or encumbrance disclosed or known to the buyer
before the contract is made;
will disturb the buyer's quiet possession of the goods.
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although the condition of right to sell and the warranties of quiet possession
and freedom from encumbrance can be limited by the seller's disclosure of his
limited title, they cannot be excluded across the board by an unconditional dis-
claimer.
2. Section 13:"s Under § 13 there is an implied condition that, in a sale
by description, the goods will correspond with the description. In a sale by
sample and description the goods must also correspond with the description.
This provision has been interpreted quite strictly against the seller. In Arcos,
Ltd. v. E. A. Ronaasen & Son,"9 for example, the goods were found to be mer-
chantable and fit for the purpose for which they were sold but the seller was
nevertheless held liable under § 13 because there was a minor deviation from
the description. A sale is "by description" under § 13 if (1) its subject is future
or unascertainable goods, 2 (2) the buyer has not seen the goods and relies on
the seller's description, 1 or (3) the goods are not sold as "specific" goods but
rather as goods corresponding to a description even if the buyer has seen them.
2
1
It is obvious that the meaning of "sale by description" is extremely broad;
conceivably, only a sale of "specific" goods physically apparent to the buyer
and sold with no representations at all could be held not to be a sale by descrip-
tion. In this connection the law with regard to self-service sales was felt by the
Commissions to be unclear even though a dictum by Lord Wright in Grant v.
Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd." seems to indicate that neither spoken nor
printed words are necessary to constitute a "description." The Commissions
felt it desirable specifically to extend the ambit of § 13 to include self-service
retail sales. Clause Two of the Bill implements their recommendation:
2. Section 13 of the principal Act (sale by description) shall be renum-
bered as subsection (1) of that section, and at the end there shall be in-
serted the following subsection:
(2) A sale of goods shall not be prevented from being a sale by de-
scription by reason only that, being exposed for sale or hire, they are
selected by the buyer.2
4
3. Section 14:25 This section provides for the implication of terms relating
to the quality of goods supplied under a contract of sale. Section 14 has been
18 § 13: Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description, there is an implied
condition that the goods shall correspond with the description; and if the sale be by sample, as
well as by description, it is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample
if the goods do not also correspond with the description.
19 [1933] A.C. 470. Accord: Armaghdown Motors v. Gray Motors, [1963] N.Z.L.R. 5;
Rapalli v. K. L. Take, [1958] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 469. But see Steels & Busks, Ltd. v. Bleeker Bik
& Co., Ltd., [1956] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 228.
20 Joseph Travers & Sons, Ltd. v. Longel, Ltd., (1947) 64 T.L.R 150, 153.
21 Varley v. Whipp, [1900] 1 Q.B. 513.
22 Beale v. Taylor, [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1193.
23 [1936] A.C. 85, 100 (P.O.).
24 With the repeal of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict., c. 28), and its
replacement by the Trade Descriptions Act, 1968 (c. 29), the civil action for breach of war-
ranty of true description provided by § 17 of the 1887 Act has ceased to exist, except insofar
as a false description can amount to a misrepresentation under § 2 (1) of the Misrepresentation
Act, 1967 (c. 7). At present, civil liability for false descriptions not amounting to mis-
representations can attach only under § 13 of the 1893 Act.
25 § 14: Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any statute in that behalf, there is
no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods
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of vast importance in the sale of goods since its enactment; it represents the
boldest attack on the doctrine of caveat emptor made by the 1893 Act, is father
to § 15 of the American Uniform Sales Act, and is grandfather to § § 2-314
and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The Commissions recommended amendments to § 14 which would be of
general applicability and would affect both consumer sales and business sales.26
The Implied Terms Bill broadens the protection offered the buyer under § 14
by removing certain restrictions from the 1893 Act." As an initial matter, the
Bill restructures § 14. Subsection (4) is moved to § 55, where it logically
belongs. Subsections (1) and (2) are reversed in order; the implied condition
of merchantable quality now precedes that of fitness for purpose, ensuring that
the provision of more general application precedes that of less general applica-
tion. This ordering is roughly congruent with the structure of §§ 2-314 and
2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The opening words of § 14 assert that there are no implied terms as to
quality or fitness for purpose except as provided in the Section and subject to
the provisions of the 1893 Act and supplementary statutes. It may be argued
that this clause has become meaningless in view of the considerable scope of
its exceptions. The Uniform Sales Act, for example, did not contain such a
supplied under a contract of sale, except as follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particu-
lar purpose for which the goods are required, so as to show that the buyer relies on the seller's
skill or judgment, and the goods are of a description which it is in the course of the seller's
business to supply (whether he be the manufacturer or not), there is an implied condition
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose, provided that in the case of a contract
for the sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied
condition as to its fitness for any particular purpose:
(2) Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that
description (whether he be the manufacturer or not), there is an implied condition that the
goods shall be of merchantable quality; provided that if the buyer has examined the goods,
there shall be no implied condition as regards defects which such examination ought to have
revealed:
(3) An implied warranty as to quality or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed
by the usage of trade:
'(4) An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition implied
by this Act unless inconsistent therewith.
26 Report, supra note 5, at 10.
27 Clause 3: For section 14 of the principal Act (implied undertakings as to quality or fit-
ness) there shall be substituted the following section:-
14.-(1) Except as provided by this section, and section 15 of this Act, and subject to
the provisions of any other enactment, there is no implied condition or warranty as to the
quality or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract of sale.
(2) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, there is an implied con-
dition that the goods supplied under the contract are of merchantable quality, except
that there is no such condition -
(a) as regards defects specifically drawn to the buyer's attention before the
condition is made; or
(b) if the buyer examines the goods before the contract is made, as regards
defects which that examination ought to reveal.
(3) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business and the buyer, expressly
or by implication, makes known to the seller any particular purpose for which the
goods are being bought, there is an implied condition that the goods supplied under
the contract are reasonably fit for that purpose, whether or not that is a purpose for
which such goods are commonly supplied, except where the circumstances show that
the buyer does not rely, or that it is unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill
or judgment.
(4) An implied condition or warranty as to quality or fitness for a particular pur-
pose may be annexed to a contract of sale by usage. ...
[October 1973]
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provision. Deletion of the clause was considered by the Commissions but they
recommended retention for two reasons: (1) the provision places sales in which
the seller is not acting in the course of business outside the purview of § 14,
and (2) it has "enabled the courts to hold (and it would be undesirable to dis-
able the courts from doing so in the future) that the implied conditions of fit-
ness and merchantability apply to all goods supplied 'under' a contract of sale
even if such goods were not themselves the subject matter of the sale."2
(a) Condition of fitness: Section 14(1) of the 1893 Act supplies an im-
plied condition that the goods are reasonably fit for the buyer's particular pur-
pose, so long as: (1) The buyer makes his purpose known, either expressly or
by implication. If the purpose is obvious-e.g., a car for driving-the buyer
need not express it in so many words. 9 (2) He relies on the seller's skill or
judgment. Reliance can be inferred in most situations when the seller is in-
formed of the buyer's purpose. This provision has thus been generously inter-
preted in the buyer's favor.2" Moreover, reliance need not be total or exclusive;
partial reliance will suffice. 1 (3) The goods are of a description which it is
in the ordinary course of the seller's business to supply, whether or not he is the
manufacturer.2 In finding goods to be of such a description, the courts have
looked at the general class of goods the seller supplies rather than at the partic-
ular goods in question. 3
It should be noted that liability under § 14 is strict. A seller who has sup-
plied goods containing a latent defect can be reached under § 14 even though
he exercised the utmost skill and judgment. 4
The reformulation of § 14 in the Implied Terms Bill jettisons the restriction
to sales where the goods are "of a description which it is in the course of the
seller's business to supply" and applies to all sales "in the course of business."85
Similarly, the Bill provides that the condition of fitness will be implied unless the
circumstances show that the buyer did not rely on the seller's skill or judgment,
or that it was unreasonable for him so to rely,38 thus reversing the burden of
proof. Finally, the Bill deletes the "patent or other trade name" provision."r
28 Report, supra note 5, at 11. For example, in Geddling v. Marsh, [1920] 1 K.B. 688, the
condition of fitness was held to apply to the bottle in which mineral water was supplied. And
in Wilson v. Rickett, Cockerell & Co., Ltd., [1954] 1 Q.B. 598, where a blasting cap was sup-
plied with an order of coal with subsequent spectacular result, § 14 was held to apply in the
face of a defense which asserted that the coal was fit for burning and the cap was not supplied
as part of the contract goods, i.e., the coal.
29 Henry Kendall & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons, Ltd., [1969] 2 A.. 21. Accord:
UNIFORM COMMERCrAL CODE § 2-315, Comment 1.
30 Ashington Piggeries, Ltd. v. Christopher Hill, Ltd., [1971] 1 All E.R. 847; Grant v. Aus-
tralian Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1936] A.C. 85; Cammel Laird & Co. v. Manganese Bronze and
Brass Co., Ltd., [1934] A.C. 402; Medway Oil & Storage Co., Ltd. v. Silica Gel Corp., (1928)
33 Com. Cas. 195.
31 See, e.g., Ashington Piggeries, Ltd. v. Christopher Hill, Ltd., [1971] 1 All E.R. 847;
ATiYAM, supra note 6, at 87.
32 This section has been held to apply to foodstuffs as well as manufactured goods,
although, unlike the Uniform Sales Act's analogous clause, "growers" are not mentioned
specifically. Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co., Ltd., [1905] 1 K.B. 608.
33 Spencer Trading Co., Ltd. v. Devon, [1947] 1 All E.R. 284.
34 Henry Kendall & Sons v. William Lillico & Sons, Ltd., [1969] 2 A.C. 31.
35 Bill clause 3 (new § 14(3)).
36 Id. The '"unreasonable" provision allows a seller to protect himself by informing the
buyer that he must not rely on the seller's skill or judgment. REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.
37 Bill clause 3. Elimination of the trade-name proviso was largely pro forma, as the Court
NOTES
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These changes represent a bit of legislative housecleaning. They bring the letter
of the statute into congruence with the spirit of the case law and do not sub-
stantially alter the character of § 14(1) of the 1893 Act.
The Commissions did, however, consider a possible reform which would
have changed § 14(1) considerably. The words "particular purpose," as they
are employed in § 14(1), have consistently been interpreted to include, in a
proper case, the only possible purpose or a usual purpose. 8 "Particular" has
been taken to mean "specified" rather than as the antonym of "general." 9
Thus, the scope of § 14(1) is considerably broader than that of Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 2-315, in which a "particular purpose" is taken to mean a use
to which the goods are not normally put.40 This restriction is a recognition that
§ 2-314-the implied warranty of merchantability-is the section on which
to rely in sales for ordinary purposes under the Code. It will be seen below that
the wide interpretation of particular purpose employed in the United Kingdom
demands a close relation of fitness and merchantable quality; indeed, the latter
might be defined in terms of the former. It was suggested to the Law Commis-
sions that the definition of "particular purpose" be recast to conform with the
American formulation. The Commissions' reason for rejecting the American rule
is worthy of quotation at length:
In interpreting section 14 as it stands at present, the English courts
have related mechantable quality to the usual purposes for which goods are
sold, and they have interpreted the phrase "particular purpose" (which
occurs in subsection (1)) as including in appropriate circumstances a usual
purpose. To this extent the case law has created an overlap between sub-
sections (1) and (2). We found on consultation that some lawyers took the
view that this overlap should be eliminated. In particular, it has been sug-
gested to us that subsection (1) should be restricted to fitness of the goods
for a special purpose (in the sense of an unusual purpose) while subsection
(2) would link merchantability to the usual purposes for which goods are
sold. Although we readily concede the attraction of this approach as a
matter of elegance, we think that the attraction is outweighed by the proven
utility of the overlap in practice. As will be seen later in this Report, we
propose to maintain the present proviso to subsection (2) whereby, if a
buyer has examined the goods, the implied condition of merchantability
does not arise as regards defects which such examination ought to have
revealed. It follows that if a consumer examines the goods but fails to detect
defects which an examination properly to be expected of him would have
detected, he will have no remedy under subsection (2) ; in the final result,
he may be worse off than he would have been if he had not examined the
goods at all. As the law stands, this danger to the buyer is mitigated by
the present formulation of subsection (1) : if, because of a careless or unskil-
ful examination, the buyer's claim falls down on merchantability, he still
has a remedy under subsection (1) if the goods prove to be unfit for the
particular purpose which had been indicated by him. But in the vast
majority of cases the buyer would lose this chance if the condition to be
of Appeal in Baldry v. Marshall, Ltd., [1925] 1 K.B. 260, "virtually interpreted the proviso
out of existence." ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 92. Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
2-315, Comment 5.
38 See, e.g., Wallis v. Russell, [1902] 2 I.R. 585; Priest v. Last, [1903] 2 K.B. 148.
39 ATinAn, supra note 6, at 88.
40 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315, Comment 2.
[October 1973]
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implied under subsection (1) were to be restricted to fitness for a special, i.e.,
unusual purpose. This, from the point of view of consumer protection,
would be a retrograde step, and accordingly in our proposals for the re-
formulation of subsection (1) we have avoided the use of any form of
words which would so restrict the implied condition of fitness.41
Thus, the problem of the effect of examination determined the Commissions'
posture on the proposed streamlining of § 14. (Indeed, to remove an ambiguity
besetting Scots law on the point, the Bill includes the amplification "whether or
not that is a purpose for which such goods are commonly supplied." 42 ) When the
condition of merchantable quality is negatived by merely perfunctory examina-
tion, then the condition of fitness for purpose can be relied upon to fill the breach.
Such a procedure might well be superior to that applicable under the Uniform
Commercial Code. Under the Code the implied warranty of fitness for purpose,
as noted above, is limited to extraordinary purposes. In most circumstances it is
thus an unsatisfactory backstop to § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity). Because of this restriction the American buyer who performs an insufficient
examination is not as fortunate as his British counterpart. Section 2-316
(3) (b) of the Code excludes implied warranties with regard to defects an
examination ought in the circumstances to reveal to a buyer who undertakes such
an examination (bearing in mind his individual skill) or who refuses to examine
(after the seller demands that he examine the goods) before the contract is
struck.4 If he refuses to examine, if his examination does not do justice to his
skill, or if his examination is not in conformity with standard methods of in-
spection, the warranties are extinguished. Thus, the American buyer who
examines the goods must take care that his examination is as thorough as his
skill will allow. Further, if he does not examine, after having been requested to
do so, there will be no implication of warranties. The British buyer who examines
also must inspect with care." If his examination is less than could be expected of
him, or if he does not examine at all, he cannot rely on the condition of mer-
chantable quality, but the condition of fitness for purpose can still be operative.
Of course, this places the British buyer who refuses to examine in a better position
than the purchaser who did not carry out his examination with sufficient care or
skill. The Commissions considered modifying this situation by reinstating the
common-law test: i.e., the condition of merchantability would be excluded with
regard to "defects which should have come to light if only the purchaser had
availed himself of whatever reasonable opportunity to examine the goods he may
have been afforded." 45 This, in effect, would impose a duty to inspect whenever
possible. The Bill does not contain such a provision. The Commissions offered
four reasons for their rejection of the common-law test: (1) it arose in a day
of simple, unsophisticated goods and a smaller retail trade; (2) definition of
"reasonable opportunity" would be prohibitively difficult; (3) "the private con-
sumer would be less well protected than he is today"; and (4) commercial buyers
41 Report, suptra note 5, at 14.
42 Bill clause " (new § 14(3)).
43 UNrORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316, Comment 8.
44 1893 Act, § 14(2).
45 Report supra note 5, at 17.
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acting in accordance with the custom of their trade are not expected to examine
even if an opportunity is afforded . 4  These considerations, the Commissions felt,
outweighed the value of eliminating the anomalous benefit granted the non-
inspecting purchaser. Thus two reforms with an American flavor were rejected-
restriction of application of the "fitness for particular purpose" provision and
imposition of a duty to inspect.
(b) Condition of merchantable quality: This implied condition arises under
the 1893 Act if the goods are sold by description by a dealer in goods of that
description. No reliance on the seller's skill or judgment need be shown." How-
ever, the proviso concerning inspection discussed above applies.4" To bring a sale
unequivocally under the "by description" requirement of the 1893 Act a buyer
need merely ask for an item by generic or trade name. 9 Nevertheless, both the
Molony Committee' and the Law Commissions9 ' recommended that across-the-
counter retail sales should be made specifically subject to the condition of
merchantable quality. The Bill therefore extends the scope of this condition to
include all sales in which the seller is acting "in the course of a business."52 This
reformulation has two major effects: (1) it broadens the class of sellers subjedt
to a duty under § 14 to include any seller acting in the course of trade, whether
or not he habitually sells goods of a given class, and (2) it broadens the class
of buyers who can rely on the condition in that the condition can arise in all
sales, not just consumer sales by description. Thus the new § 14(2) will be of
wider applicability than its predecessor. Under the Bill the condition of mer-
chantable quality can be excluded, in consumer sales, only when (1) the seller
has brought defects specifically to the buyer's notice, extinguishing the condition
with regard to these defects,5" or (2) the buyer's examination-if he chooses to
examine-reveals defects or should reveal defects, again excluding the condition
with regard only to those specific defects. 4
The central difficulty confronting the Law Commissions in drafting the new
condition of merchantable quality was the definition of "merchantable quality"
itself. The term is undefined in the 1893 Act, except for indication in § 62 that
46 Id.
47 ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 76.
48 For an example of a hasty inspection which negatived the implied condition of merchant-
able quality, see Thornett & Fehr v. Beers & Son, [1919] 1 K.B. 486, in which the buyer in-
spected only the outside of a consignment of barrels of glue even though the seller afforded
opportunity to examine further.
49 LowE, supra note 8, at 76.
50 FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER PROTECTION (Molony Committee),
Cmnd. No. 1781, para. 441 (1962).
51 Report, supra note 5, at 16.
52 Bill clause 3 (new § 14(2)). The contrasting American treatment of the "by descrip-
tion" requirement is of interest. The requirement, as found in § 15(2) of the Uniform Sales
Act, was often ignored by the courts when it would have limited applicability of § 15(2) to
future or unascertained goods. (But see Kirk v. Stineway Drug Store Co., 38 Ill. App. 2d 327,
187 N.E.2d 30-1 (1963). The requirement was enforced, however, insofar as it required com-
munication between buyer and seller describing the goods; without this communication the
warranty -f merciantability did not arise. Self-service sales were thus held not to be sales by
description, and no implied warranty of merchantability was therefore ascribed to them. See,
e.g., Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 341, 378 P.2d 298 (1963); Torpey v. Red Owl
Stores, Inc., 228 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1955). UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(1), of
course, does not require that the sale be "by description."
53 Bill clause 3 (new § 14(2) (a)).
54 Id. (new § 14(2) (b)).
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"quality" of goods is to include their "state or condition." Numerous courts, ab-
horring the statutory vacuum, have advanced definitions of their own, chief
among them the following:
(1) In Bristol Tramways Carriage Co. u. Fiat Motors,55 Lord Justice
Farwell advanced the following definition:
The phrase in § 14 subsection (2) is, in my opinion, used as meaning that
the article is of such quality and in such a condition that a reasonable man
acting reasonably would, after a full examination, accept it under the cir-
cumstances of the case in preference of his offer to buy that article, whether
he buys for his own use or to sell again.56
This "salability" definition separates purpose and merchantability. It has been
criticized for not taking into account the state of the market, and the difficulty of
applying a "reasonableness" standard. Moreover, it would allow goods with
latent defects not revealed by a full examination to be classed as "merchant-
able."
5'
(2) Lord Farwell's definition was, however, adopted with amplification by
Judge Dixon of the High Court of Australia in Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd.
v. Grant.5" Judge Dixon held that, to be of merchantable quality, the goods
... should be in such an actual state that a buyer fully acquainted with the
facts and therefore knowing what hidden defects exist and not being limited
to their apparent condition would buy them without abatement of the price
obtainable for such goods if in reasonably sound order and condition and
without special terms.59
(3) Lord Wright produced two definitions which seem to characterize
merchantability in terms of fitness for ordinary purpose. In Cammell Laird &
Co. Ltd. v. The Manganese Bronze & Brass Co. Ltd." he suggested that "un-
merchantable quality" means that "the goods in the form in which they were
rendered were of no use for any purpose for which such goods would normally
be used and hence were not saleable under that description." 1 In his speech
in the Privy Council in the Australian Knitting Mills case Lord Wright proposed
that an article is merchantable if it is normally meant for one particular use and
is "fit for that use."'82 These definitions have been criticized. In Henry Kendall
& Sons, Ltd. v. William Lillico & Sons, Ltd.,3 four Law Lords pointed out that
the Wright formulation makes no reference to price; a price reduction could con-
ceivably persuade a buyer to purchase "unmerchantable" goods.8" In Bartlett v.
Sydney Marcus, Ltd. 5 Lord Denning observed that there
55 [1910] 2 K.B. 831.
56 Id. at 841.
57 See Yates, supra note 10, at 61, and cases cited therein.
58 (1933) 50 C.L.R. 387.
59 Id. at 408.
60 [1934] A.C. 402.
61 Id. at 430.
62 Sub nom. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd., [1936] A.C. 85, 100.
63 [1969] 2 A.C. 31.
64 But see Lord Reid's speech, id. at 79.
65 [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1013.
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is a considerable territory where on the one hand you cannot say that the
article is "of no use" at all, and on the other hand, cannot say that it is
entirely "fit for use." The article may be of some use though not entirely
efficient use for the purpose. It may not be in perfect condition but yet it is
in a usable condition. It is then, I think, merchantable.
Under this argument, "merchantable quality" will depend to a large extent on
the description of the goods. In Bartlett a car with a defective clutch had been
sold as a "secondhand" car. Under that description and the above reasoning,
Lord Denning found it merchantable. Further, under § 14(1) of the 1893 Act,
as it has been judicially interpreted, fitness for purpose can include ordinary
purpose. If the buyer fails to communicate his particular purpose, the ordinary
purpose to which the goods are put will be implied. The resulting condition that
the goods will be fit for ordinary purposes is coextensive with the condition of
merchantable quality under Lord Wright's formulation, which implies fitness
for the "purpose for which such goods would normally be used." The Law
Commissions' response to this lack of definitional grace was quoted above in the
discussion of the condition of fitness.
In the Kendall case Lords Guest, Pearce, and Wilberforce appeared to
favor Lord Justice Farwell's definition as modified by judge Dixon, but it might
be noted that Lord Wright's definition wins if wigs are counted. It was favored
by Judge Havers at first instance, three Lords Justices of Appeal, and, with
certain changes, by two Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (Lord Morris of Borth-y-
Gest and Lord Reid). All observations in the House of Lords were, however,
dicta.
The Law Commissions, surveying the less than homophonic pronounce-
ments found in the case law, resolved to supply a definition for inclusion in the
Implied Terms Bill. The Working Party's recommendation,6 7 based on Lord
Justice Farwell's test, was rejected as being unduly complicated. A new definition
was formulated and, after minor modifications, now appears in the Bill:
After section 62(1) of the principal Act there shall be inserted the
following subsection:-
"(1A) Goods of any kind are of merchantable quality within the
meaning of this Act if they are as fit for the purpose or purposes for
which goods of that kind are commonly bought as it is reasonable to
expect having regard to any description applied to them, the price (if
relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances; and any reference
in this Act to unmerchantable goods shall be construed accordingly."' 8
The Commissions concluded:
It appears to us that the new formula has the advantage of being more in
line with the text of Article 33(1) (d) of the Uniform Law on the Inter-
66 Id. at 1015.
67 Law Commission (Published Working Paper No. 18) and Scottish Law Commission
(Memorandum No. 7), Provisional Proposals Relating to Amendments to Sections 12-15 of the
Sale of Goods Act, 1893 and Contracting Out of the Conditions and Warranties Implied by
Those Sections, 22 May 1968, para. 23.
68 Bill clause 7(2) (new § 62(1A)).
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national Sale of Goods 9 [than the tentative formulation] and with one of
the minimum standards of merchantability laid down in section 2-
314(2) (c) of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code.
7 0
The Bill differs from the Code, however, in that it imposes a condition of
merchantability-at least a modicum of merchantability-on goods described as
"secondhand," "shop-soiled," or "seconds" (American: "as is" or "with all
faults"), whereas the Code specifically exempts such goods from all implied
warranties."' In the view of the Commissions, even such goods "should measure
up to some standard of fitness, and a seller who describes goods in such or
similar terms should not be permitted to sell what is in effect useless rubbish. ' 72
The Bill's definition of merchantable quality is welcome. Merchantability
and fitness are still symbiotically intertwined, but the relationship, thus exposed,
should cause little difficulty. Problems might arise, however, when a buyer pur-
chases goods for an unusual purpose which he does not communicate to the
seller. If the goods prove unfit for his purpose, without outright misuse, he
cannot assert that they were of unmerchantable quality as it is defined in terms
of fitness for the "purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly
bought." The condition of fitness for purpose is also of no avail, as he has not
communicated his purpose to the seller and it will not be implied if it is "un-
usual." He must attempt to rely on § 13-congruence with description in a
sale by description-but after Ashington Piggeries he may find that "description"
and "quality" are two very different concepts.
7
1
The interrelationship of merchantability and fitness for purpose was exposed
in Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 4 in which the Third Circuit held
that cigarettes which caused plaintiff's lung cancer might have been sold in
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Pritchard echoes the "war-
ranty of safety" cases, which implicated warranties in the sale of food and
drink.7 5 A "purpose-oriented" definition of merchantability, however, might well
have generated a different result. Most consumers do not (at least consciously)
purchase cigarettes for the purpose of contracting lung cancer. Of course, the
serious jurisprudential problem of paternalism lurks in the wings."
The linkage of merchantability with fitness for ordinary purpose is recogni-
69 Article 33(1): The seller shall not have fulfilled his obligation to deliver the goods,
where he has handed over: . .. (d) goods which do not possess the qualities necessary for their
ordinary or commercial use....
70 Report, supra note 5, at 16.
71 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316(3) (a).
72 Report, supra note 5, at 19. The Molony Committee, however, favored adoption of the
American position. Final Report. supra note 50, para. 445. The Bill's posture was apparently
prompted by certain practices in the British used-car trade. Report at 19.
73 Four Law Lords found in Ashington Piggeries that the presence of a chemical lethal to
mink in foodstuff prepared by the defendants was a matter of quality or condition and not
identity or description. The mink food met its description, so far as the description went; the
fact that it killed mink was a matter of quality under § 14. Ashington Piggeries, Ltd. v.
Christopher Hill, Ltd., [1971] 1 All E.R. 847, at 853, 858, 872, 884. See Yates, supra note 10,
at 59-60.
74 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
75 See e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 "(1927).
76 Cf. e.g., Keeton, Products Liability--Liability without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEx. L. Rv. 855 (1963); Rossi, The Cigarette-Cancer Problem: Plaintiff's Choice
of Theories Explored, 34 So. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1961).
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tion of the dose conceptual relationship between §§ 14(1) and (2) of the 1893
Act. Judge Diplock (as he then was) has said that they are "two sides of the
same coin,'' yet, strictly speaking, purpose is irrelevant under § 14(2). Pro-
cedurally, §§ 14(1) and (2) have been treated as entirely separate. Obligations
under them, the courts have held, are unrelated; breaches must be pleaded
separately. A purchaser's case can fall between the sections and it will fail
under each."8 Perhaps open recognition of the conceptual interdependence of
the terms will result in greater protection under § 14.
III. Contracting Out of the Implied Terms
Imposed by the 1893 Act
A. Section 55
The terms implied by sections 12-15 of the 1893 Act "were intended to
import into contracts for the sale of goods certain rules of fair dealing,"79 and they
have generally served the buyer's interests well. But whatever implied terms may
arise in a given case are subordinated to the autonomy of the parties. Section
550 provides that any right, duty, or liability arising from a contract for sale by
implication of law may be negatived or varied by express agreement, the course
of dealing between the parties, or by usage.
Since the end of the First World War contractual erosion-or outright
demolition-of the implied warranties has become disquietingly widespread in
the United Kingdom. Exemption clauses are found most frequently in printed
"boilerplate" contracts for the sale of major appliances or automobiles. These
disclaimers can take several forms: (1) denial of the existence of any express
or implied warranty; (2) limitation or liquidation of consequential damages;
(3) limitation of the buyer's remedies in general; (4) attachment of (oc-
casionally oppressive) conditions to the buyer's possible remedies, such as notice
requirements; (5) imposition of a duty on the buyer to indemnify; and (6) in-
clusion of a statement to the effect that the buyer has assumed the risk of any
defects."'
Of course, such clauses can be used to exempt the seller from liability for
negligence as well as breach of implied warranty. Frequently the British con-
sumer is asked to sign a "manufacturer's guarantee" which limits or excludes the
manufacturer's liability for negligence or breach of implied warranty in con-
sideration of the supply of free replacement parts and labor for a specified time.
The Law Commissions' Report and the Implied Terms Bill itself deal only with
contractual exclusion or modification of the implied terms as between the parties
to the sale. The problem of guarantees has been treated in the Commissions'
77 Mash & Murrell, Ltd. v. Joseph 1. Emanuel, Ltd., [1961] 1 W.L.R. 862, 866.
78 See, e.g., Sumner Permain & Co. v. Webb & Co., [1922] 1 K.B. 55. See generally Davies,
supra note 10.
79 Report, supra note 5, at 24.
80 § 55 of the 1893 Act is quoted at note 15.
81 Note, 17 M.L.R. 155 (1954).
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Working Paper on exclusion of liability for negligence;82 further study is now
under way.
The Molony Committee found that the principal criticism applicable to the
law of sale of goods was
the ease and frequency with which vendors and manufacturers of goods
exclude the operation of the statutory conditions and warranties by pro-
visions in guarantee cards or other contractual documents.88
The Law Commissions recognized that English law of today, no less than
English law of 1893, subordinates marketplace "fair play" to the principle of
contractual freedom. For example, it is an established principle of English con-
tract interpretation that a signed document is prima facie conclusive as to the
terms of the bargain; the buyer need not have understood, or even read, the
document." The Law Commissions examined the problem of contractual
evasion of the implied terms in sales of all types, principally consumer sales and
business sales. The broad control of exemption clauses imposed by the Implied
Terms Bill" harmonized with the spirit of a long line of judicial attacks on
disclaimers.
82 The Law Commission (Published Working Paper No. 39) and Scottish Law Commission
(Memorandum No. 15), Provisional Proposals Relating to the Exclusion of Liability for Negli-
gence in the Sale of Goods and Exemption Clauses in Contracts for the Supply of Services and
other Contracts, 27 September 1971.
83 Cited in Report, supra note 5, at 24.
84 L'Estrange v. Graucob, [1934] 2 K.B. 394.
85 Clause 4: For section 55 of the principal Act '(exclusion of implied terms and condi-
tions) there shall be substituted the following section:
55.-(1) Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a contract of sale of goods
by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement, or by the
course of dealing between the parties, or by usage if the usage is such as to bind both
parties to the contract, but the foregoing provisions shall have effect subject to the follow-
ing provisions of this section.
(2) An express condition or warranty does not negative a condition or warranty
implied by this Act unless inconsistent therewith.
(3) In the case of a contract of sale of goods, any term of that or any other contract
exempting from all or any of the provisions of section 12 of this Act shall be void.
(4) In the case of a contract of sale of goods, any term of that or any other contract
exempting from all or any of the provisions of section 13, 14 or 15 of this Act shall be void
in the case of a consumer sale and shall, in any other case, not be enforceable to the extent
that it is shown that it would not be fair or reasonable to allow reliance on the term.
(5) In determining for the purposes of subsection (4) above whether or not reliance
on any such term would be fair or reasonable regard shall be had to all the circumstances
of the case and in particular to the following matters -
(a) The strength of the bargaining positions of the seller and buyer relative to
each other, taking into account, among other things, the availability of suitable
alternative products and sources of supply;
(b) whether the buyer received an inducement to agree to the term or in
accepting it had an opportunity of buying the goods or suitable alternatives
without it from any source of supply;
(c) whether the buyer knew or ought reasonably to have known of the existence
and extent of the term (having regard, among other things, to any custom of the
trade and any previous course of dealing between the parties) ;
(d) where the term exempts from all or any of the provisions of section 13, 14
or 15 of this Act if some condition is not complied with, whether it was reason-
able at the time of the contract to expect that compliance with that condition
would be practicable;
(e) whether the goods were manufactured, processed, or adapted to the special
order of the buyer.
(6) Subsection '(5) above shall not prevent the court from holding, in accordance
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B. Judicial Hostility to Exemption Clauses
"The attitude of the courts to these [exemption] clauses is clearly one of
hostility," asserts one commentator, "and it is no exaggeration to say that any
loophole will be seized upon if it enables justice to be done.""6 It certainly ap-
pears that the principle of freedom of contract has suffered somewhat at the
hands of the courts of the British welfare state and that the private consumer has
gained thereby. No fewer than eight methods which can be employed to in-
validate exemption clauses have been discerned. 7 Although hardly a catalogue
of "loopholes," some are at best legalistic; and one, the "doctrine" of funda-
mental breach, seems to be a conscious exercise in esotericism. The principal
avenues of attack on exemption clauses have been:
(1) Legislation: The Hire-Purchase Act, 1938,"8 enacted to supply some
measure of protection for consumers faced with judicial refusal to alter the terms
of their contracts, 9 provided a precedent for the prohibition of clauses purporting
to negative or modify the implied conditions. The Implied Terms Bill, of course,
makes similar provision.
(2) Nonincorporation into the contract: The seller must show that the
exemption clause was indeed a part of the contract, either by (a) showing that
the buyer signed a contract including the clause, or (b) showing that the clause
was brought to the buyer's notice.9" In Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking, Ltd., 1
where the defendant was found not to have done enough to include the clause
in the contract, the rule was put rather starkly: the seller must do everything
reasonable to make known not merely the existence, but also the nature of the
conditions he is imposing.
(3) Fraud or misrepresentation: It appears from some dicta in L'Estrange
with any rule of law, that a term which purports to exclude or restrict any of the provi-
sions of section 13, 14 or 15 of this Act is not a term of the contract.
(7) In this section "consumer sale" means a sale of goods (other than a sale by
auction or by competitive tender) by a seller in the course of a business where the goods
'(a) are of a type ordinarily bought for private use or consumption; and
(b) are sold to a person who does not buy or hold himself out as buying them
in the course of a business.
(8) The onus of proving that a sale falls to be treated for the purposes of this
section as not being a consumer sale shall lie on the party so contending.
(10) It is hereby declared that any reference in this section to a term of a contract
includes a reference to a term which although not contained in a contract is incorporated
in the contract by another term of the contract.
86 Ar AE, supra note 6, at 117.
87 Note, 17 M.L.R. 155, 156-57 (1954). This concise note presents a clear and reliable
survey of the topic.
88 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 53, repealed and reenacted in large measure by the Hire-Purchase Act,
1965, c. 66.
89 See Lord Justice McKinnon's remark in South Bedfordshire Electrical Finance, Ltd. v.
Bryant, [1938] 3 All E.R. 580, 584: ". . . if anyone is so foolish as to enter into such an agree-
ment as this, I do not know that his case can be considered harsh.'
90 ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 117. See Harling v. Eddy, [1951] 2 K.B. 739.
91 [1971] 2 Q.B. 163.
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v. Graucob92 that an exemption clause will be struck down if agreement to it
was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation.9 3
(4) Strict construction: Generally, exemption clauses are construed contra
proferentem. The courts will import strict legal meanings to any technical
terms. 4 Moreover, exemption clauses will not, as a principle of construction,
be held to protect the seller from a fundamental breach of his obligation under
the contract. Thus such a clause will not excuse a breach of the obligation to
provide goods corresponding with their description95 or sample,96 in the ap-
propriate circumstances,97 even if the goods are supplied with the words "with all
faults."9
(5) Complete failure to perform: The seller who has contracted to provide
peas and instead supplies beans cannot rely on an exemption clause, no matter
how broadly worded. 9
(6) Modification: In the face of an exemption clause courts have, on oc-
casion, discovered a later express warranty0 0 or an earlier express warranty, 1 '
usually parol, which is not excluded by the clause itself and forms a collateral
binding agreement.
(7) Liability in tort: A manufacturer-defendant who is sued in tort by an
aggrieved consumer cannot invoke an exemption clause, absent a collateral
contract such as a "guarantee," because he was not privy to the contract of sale.
As between parties, one cannot contract out of liability for wilful or fraudulent
torts. Otherwise exemption clauses can be given effect, but the courts will be
extraordinarily hostile.
10 2
(8) Fundamental breach: The doctrine of fundamental breach seems to
have evolved from the rules regarding deviation cases in Admiralty law" 3 and
the rule in Gibaud v. Great Eastern Ry. Co. 4 These authorities declared that a
breach of condition gives a right to treat a contract as ended, after which, the
contract being broken, any exemptions provided by it are void. 0 5 Such a
principle rested on the concept of a fundamental obligation, the breach of which
could not be excused by an exemption clause. 0 6 The principle of "fundamental
breach" was sharpened in the course of three decisions by Judge Devlin (as he
then was),' 07 and in Karsales (Harrow), Ltd. v. Walli "' Lord Justice Denning
92 [1934] 2 K.B. 394.
93 See Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing, [1951] 1 K.B. 805.
94 Wallis, Son & Wells v. Pratt, [1911] A.C. 394. See Baldry v. Marshall, [1925] 1 K.B.
260; Beck & Co., Ltd. v. Szymanowski & Co., Ltd., [19241 A.C. 43.
95 Robert A. Munro & Co., Ltd. v. Meyer, [1930] 2 K.B. 312.
96 Champanhac & Co., Ltd. v. Waller & Co., Ltd., [1948] 2 All E.R. 724.
97 See AT1YAH, supra note 6, at 120.
98 Id. See, contra, UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
99 Andrews v. Singer, [1934] 1 K.B. 17.
100 Couchman v. Hill, [1947] K.B. 544.
101 Webster v. Higgins, [1948] 2 All E.R. 127.
102 See, e.g., Rutter v. Palmer, [1922] 2 K.B. 87; Alderslade v. Hendon Laundry, Ltd.
[1945], K.B. 189. See also the Law Commission, supra note 82.
103 Hain S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Tate & Lyle, Ltd., [1936] 2 All E.R. 597.
104 [1921] 2 K.B. 426.
105 See the Law Commission, supra note 82, at 89 et seq.
106 Alderslade v. Hendon Laundry, Ltd., [19451 K.B. 189.
107 Chandris v. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co., Inc., [1951] 1 K.B. 240; Alexander v. Railway Ex-
ecutives, [1951] 2 K.B. 882; Smeaton Hanscomb v. Sassoon I. Setty Son & Co. (No. 1), [1953]
1 W.L.R. 1468.
108 [1956] 1 W.L.R. 936.
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(as he then was) crystallized what had already become a rule of law, at least in
the Court of Appeal, by holding that "a breach which goes to the root of the
contract disentitles that party from relying on the exempting clause."' 9
The House of Lords, however, cut this line of development short in Suisse
Atlantique Societj d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Koler
Centrale."0 Their Lordships held that there exists no rule of law under which
an exemption clause is automatically nullified by a fundamental breach of con-
tract or breach of a fundamental term, but the issue is in each case a matter of
construction. If a breach occurs which entities the innocent party to repudiate
the contract but he elects to affirm it, the exemption clause continues in force un-
less, on the true construction of the contract, the clause is not intended either to
apply to or continue after the breach, in which case the party in breach cannot
rely on the clause. Their Lordships were thus unwilling to assume that a wily
draftsman could not produce an exemption clause which could apply to cases of
fundamental breach."'
The doctrine as modified by Suisse Atlantique was subsequently applied in
two cases in the Court of Appeal (the influence of Suisse Atlantique, it might be
noted, appears to have been rather slight) the redoubtable Lord Denning, Master
of the Rolls, again striking down exemption clauses." 2 In the Harbutt's case the
innocent party had purported to affirm the contract after breach but was told
that there was no contract left to affirm. Moreover, even when the innocent
party affirms, the court declared, an exemption clause might still be struck down.
In Farnworth, in which a hire-purchaser's motorcycle contained several defects,
the courts held that, taken in the aggregate, the defects constituted a funda-
mental breach of contract and disabled the defendant from reliance on the
exemption clauses."'
The present state of the law relating to fundamental breach is unclear." 4
It seems that a distinction ought to be made between breaches which completely
destroy the basis of agreement, automatically nullifying exemption clauses
designed to protect against them," 5 and less serious breaches which still enable
the aggrieved party to repudiate the contract, in which case exemption clauses
will be given effect if, as a matter of construction, they express the intent of the
109 Id. at 940.
110 [1967] 1 A.C. 361. See generally Drake, Fundamentalism in Contract, 30 M.L.R. 531
(1967).
111 Suisse Atlantique thus limits, in greater or lesser measure, most of the cases on funda-
mental breach which preceded it, including those above cited and, inter alia, Charterhouse
Credit Co., Ltd. v. Tolly, [1963] 2 Q.B. 683; Astley Industrial Trust, Ltd. v. Grimley, [1963]
2 All E.R. 33; Yeoman Credit, Ltd. v. Aps, [1962] 2 Q.B. 508.
112 Harbutt's "Plasticine," Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co., Ltd., [1970] 1 Q.B. 477;
Farnworth Finance Facilities v. Attryde, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1053.
113 As early as Pollock & Co. v. Macrae, 1922 S.C. 192 (H.L.), Scots law recognized that
"total breach" could result from a "congeries of defects." See The Law Commission, supra note
82, at 89.
114 See ATrYAH, supra note 6, at 121: ... it cannot be said that this is an area which has
been well illuminated by recent decisions." See also Guest, Fundamental Breach of Contract, 77
L.Q.R. 98 (1961); Reynolds, Warranty, Condition and Fundamental Term, 79 L.Q.R. 534
(1963).
115 As in Glynn v. Margetson & Co., [1893] A.C. 351; Lilley v. Doubleday, [1881] 7 Q.B.D.
510. See Harbutt's "Plasticine," Ltd. v. Wayne Tank and Pump Co., Ltd., [1971] 2 All E.R.
708; Farnworth Finance Facilities, Ltd. v. Attryde, [1970] 2 All E.R. 774.
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parties at the time of the contract. '1 But this distinction overlooks a difficulty
with cases in the first category. In these cases the fundamental breach is said to
nullify the exemption clauses by bringing the contract to a complete end, but
under general contract theory breach operates only to terminate the contract for
the future and "does not disentitle the parties from relying on clauses (e.g., an
arbitration clause) in relation to events occurring before termination.""17 Exemp-
tion clauses will obviously apply to events occurring before the contract is termi-
nated. If Suisse Atlantique is read narrowly this problem does not arise, but the
decisions in Harbutt's and Farnworth do not appear to circumvent it. Moreover,
Suisse Atlantique seems to recognize a difference between breach of funda-
mental terms, which constitutes a fundamental breach even if the consequences
are trivial (e.g., if a minor term has been agreed upon as "fundamental" by the
parties), and fundamental breach of contract (which might consist of the breach
of nonfundamental terms, or an aggregation of them), which is adjudged
"fundamental" because its consequences are grave."8
This distinction having been drawn, it would be sensible to allow exemption
clauses to protect against relatively minor breaches. The focus in the cases, after
all, is on the consequences of the breach. The rule of construction in Suisse
Atlantique is predicated on the assumption that the parties did not intend exemp-
tion clauses to excuse catastrophic breach, and the rule of law in Karsales pre-
scribes that exemption clauses cannot survive once the consequences of the breach
become severe enough. Yet the balance point between judicial abhorrence of a
breaching party's successful invocation of a clause completely excusing him from
liability and judicial refusal to violate the autonomy of the parties is still to be
found. The Implied Terms Bill alleviates the problem completely in sales to
private consumers, but in business sales the problem could very well remain alive.
The point of the doctrine of fundamental breach is simply "to require the
party who seeks protection to make clear the extent of the protection he is seek-
ing.""' 9 When he has done so it will be a matter for judicial determination
whether, under the Implied Terms Bill, a commercial party's reliance on the
exemption clause will be "fair or reasonable"' 2 in "all the circumstances of the
case."'' Presumably this criterion leaves room for the continued application of
the principle of fundamental breach .
2 2
American courts have shown a similar hostility towards exemption clauses,'
123
116 Kenyon, Son and Craven, Ltd. v. Baxter Hoare & Co., Ltd., [1971] 2 All E.R. 708, fol-
lowing Suisse Atlantique.
117 The Law Commissions, supra note 82, at 98.
118 See ATIYAH, supra note 6, at 122.
119 Id. at 123-24.
120 Bill clause 4 (new§ 55(4), (5)).
121 Id. (new§ 55(5)).
122 In clause 4 the Bill suggests as one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether
reliance on a clause exempting from §§ 13-15 is reasonable, "whether it was reasonable at the
time of the contract to expect that compliance with that condition [which, on non-compliance,
triggers the exemption clause] would be practicable." (Emphasis added.) The limitation of the
time frame to the time of the contract harmonizes with Suisse Atlantique's emphasis on the
constructional aspect of the problem.
123 See generally DeChaine, Products Liability and the Disclaimer, 4 Wms. & MAny L. Rv.
364 (1967); Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-
Products Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 44, 192, 210-212 (1955); Keeton, Assumption of Risk
in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122 (1961); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of
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although their range of inventiveness in striking them down is somewhat more
restricted. In general, they have either construed them away or found that they
were not adequately communicated to the other party. It is apparent that
complete failure to perform, "total breach," or failure of consideration will not
be excused by a disclaimer-the English "peas and beans" scenario." 4 In some
cases, disclaimers have been struck down because they were made before the
contract was completed.'25 Further, the disclaimer must be brought home to the
purchaser.' Disclaimers were often held not to apply to the implied warranties
under the Uniform Sales Act or their common-law counterparts ."2 As did the
English courts, some American jurisdictions have refused to allow exemption
clauses to affect the primary obligation to provide a product meeting its descrip-
tion.
1 28
Disclaimers are largely ineffective if strict liability is applied. In 1922 the
rule was announced that a manufacturer could not insulate himself from liability
in a strict liability environment by means of an exemption clause because, if
warranties do not run with the goods, neither can disclaimers." 9 Reliance on a
contractual provision (with the exception of clauses indicating that the buyer
has assumed the risk of damage) in the face of strict liability is generally useless.
The development of the judicial attitude toward exemption clauses is outlined at
length in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc."' Henningsen's invalidation of
both the manufacturer's"' and retailer's" 2 disclaimers spawned a number of
decisions imposing strict liability and invalidating exemption clauses, either as
elements of contracts of adhesion violative of public policy or as unconscionable
because of the possibility of unfair surprise."'
A party wishing to exempt himself from liability for breach of implied war-
ranties may still find statutory shelter. Section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act
sanctioned sellers' exemption clauses which disclaimed the existence of a war-
ranty, limited it to particular defects or consequences, or restricted the buyers'
Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. Rv. 117, 157-167 (1943); Rishe, Products Liability Meets
the Disclaimer: Distorted Concepts, 12 SOUTH TEx. L. J. 137 (1970).
124 Meyers v. Land, 314 Ky. 514, 235 S.W. 2d 588 (1951); Rocky Mountain Seed Co. v.
Knorr, 92 Colo. 320, 20 P.2d 304 (1933).
125 Ward v. Valker, 44 N.D. 598, 176 N.W. 129 (1920); Amzi Golden Seed Co. v. Smith,
185 Ala. 296, 64 So. 100 (1913); Edgar v. Joseph Breck & Sons Corp., 172 Mass. 581, 52
N.E. 1083 (1899).
126 Black v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S.C. 112, 155 S.E. 268 (1930).
127 McPeak v. Boker, 236 Minn. 420, 53 N.W.2d 130 (1952); Hughes v. National Equip-
ment Corp., 216 Iowa 1000, 250 N.W. 154 (1933); Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Coclin, 161 S.C.
140, 159 S.E. 461 (1931); Lutz v. Hill Diesel Engine Co., 255 Mich. 98, 237 N.W. 546
(1931); Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E. 327 (1928);
Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927).
128 Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 104 (1954); United Fig &
Date Co. v. Falkenburg, 176 Wash. 122, 28 P.2d 287 (1934); Meyer v. Packard Cleveland
Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118 (1922).
129 Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell & Co., 122 Wash. 620, 624, 211 P. 748, 750 (1922).
130 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
131 Followed in, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa
1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338
S.W.2d 655 (1960).
132 Followed in, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964).
133 See, e.g., Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 59 Misc. 2d 241 298 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1969); Ford
Motor Co. v. Tutt, 244 Ark. 883, 430 S.W.2d 778 (1968); Crown v. Cecil Holland Ford, Inc.,
207 So. 2d 67 (Fla. App. 1968).
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remedies to replacement, repair, return of the price, and the like. This provision
was of course patterned after § 55 of the 1893 Act. Section 2-316 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code,' while providing a measure of protection for the buyer
against surprise, nevertheless permits contractual abridgement of the implied
warranties in consumer sales."'
Thus, before the Implied Terms Bill, the British statutory attitude towards
exemption clauses was more permissive than the American, but the English courts
had established a rigorous obstacle course for each disclaimer to negotiate if it
was to be upheld. Still, one British commentator observed that "[it is, neverthe-
less, clear that the power of the courts to protect consumers and other buyers
against oppressive exemption clauses is severely limited" in the face of prima
fade statutory acceptance. 3 '
IV. The Comparative Products Liability Environments
It is at this point, the theme having been sounded, that the transatlantic
variations begin. American courts have hastened, molto allegro, into the areas of
strict liability and unconscionability, invalidating exemption clauses as they go.
The British, on the other hand, have proceeded lento maestoso to remove a
difficulty inherent in the time-honored structure of contractual liability. Amer-
ican jurisdictions have rushed by the ailing conceptual framework of warranty,
which was hobbled by exemption clauses and privity requirements; the British
while reluctant to disturb privity's senescent slumber have-as an interim
measure, at least-provided the individual consumer statutory protection against
disclaimers which his American cousin does not enjoy.
134 § 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchant-
ability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing
must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclu-
sion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fit-
ness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "there are no warranties which extend beyond
the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection '(2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded
by expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes
plain that there is no implied warranty;
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or
course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions
of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modification of
remedy (§§ 2-718 and 2-719).
135 See generally Hawkland, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
11 How. L. J. 28 (1965). The buyer is further handicapped by the fact that "'merchant-
ability" is a term of art and not a term of common understanding. See Shanker, Strict Tort
Theory of Products Liability and the U.C.C., 17 WESTERN RESERVE L. REv. 5, 43 (1965). It
might be argued that, even with the restrictions on limitation of damages imposed by §§
2-718 and 2-719, the situation can only work against the average consumer. Perhaps, how-
ever, § 2-316 could be seen as subject to the Code provisions relating to good faith (§
1-203) and unconscionability (§ 2-302). See Shanker, supra.
136 AIYAr, supra note 6, at 130.
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A. The Scope of the Implied Terms Bill's Limitation of Exemption Clauses
The Molony Committee was disturbed by the widespread employment of
exemption clauses, finding that the average consumer seldom understood their
import and, when he did, often had little choice in accepting the clauses if he
wanted to obtain the goods. 3 ' They thus recommended legislation declaring
most such clauses to be of no effect."8 Subsequent pressure from the Consumer
Council and consumers' action groups, as well as some traders, resulted in an
apparent decrease in the frequency of wide exemption clauses in the automobile
and electric-appliance trades.' 9 The Law Commissions' Working Party, once
established, began to take evidence on the employment and effect of exemption
clauses, but found the task rather difficult: retailers seldom attempt to exclude
their liability by a direct clause in their contract of sale with purchasers. "That
is usually done indirectly by limiting the buyer's rights, or leading the buyer to
believe that his rights are limited to those to which he is entitled under the
manufacturer's guarantee."' 40 Moreover, consumers seldom go to law to assert
their rights and consequently "many situations remain untested by judicial
decisions."' 1
The Law Commissions' Working Party found itself in agreement with the
Molony Committee's main proposal that in sales to private consumers any ex-
clusion of the statutory conditions and warranties should be void. 4 ' It considered
and rejected one proposal which would have allowed limitation of consequential
damages and another which would have imposed a "reasonable reliance" test
for all exemption clauses;143 and it decided that the prohibition on contracting
out should be "absolute and unqualified."' 4 4 It was so recommended, with
regard to consumer sales, by the Law Commissions in their report.4 5 The Com-
missions also entertained the possibility of extending the class of those protected
by the recommended prohibition to include "consumers" other than private
purchasers. It was argued that in some cases a prohibition on disclaimers would
be desirable in business sales, especially where the buyer, even though a "trade
buyer," does not enjoy a rough parity in bargaining position with the seller.
Clause 4 (new § 55(7)) of the Bill defines a "consumer sale," to which an
absolute ban on contracting out of §§ 12-15 applies, as
a sale of goods (other than a sale by auction or by competitive tender) by a
seller in the course of a business where the goods-
(a) are of a type ordinarily bought for private use or consumption; and
(b) are sold to a person who does not buy or hold himself out as buying
them in the course of a business.
137 Molony Committee, supra note 50, paras. 431-435.
138 Id. para. 445.
139 REPORT, supra note 5, at 26.





145 Id. at 30.
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The burden of proving that a sale is not a consumer sale is placed on the
party so contending. 4
Prohibition of exemption clauses in consumer sales contracts only, of course,
puts the retailer at risk. He may have accepted goods under an exemption clause
imposed by his supplier. Consequently, he cannot protect himself vis-a-vis the
consumer and he is precluded by the clause imposed upon him from passing
liability back to the party at fault.
Evidence presented to the Working Party revealed widespread use of
exemption clauses in contracts for the sale of aircraft, computers, and complex
machinery, and in sales of goods intended to be resold (e.g., automobiles); but
"certain organisations representing large enterprises of the retail trade have
pointed out that it happened but rarely that exemption clauses were imposed
upon their members."' 47 Moreover, "[t]he evidence disclosed only a very small
number of cases where unfairness or injustice resulted from these clauses."' 48
There was, on the other hand, considerable anxiety in the Commissions over the
position of retailers under a prohibition of exemption clauses on the private
consumer level, and the position stabilized with the Commissioners evenly divided
as to the desirability of general control of exemption clauses in business sales.'49
It was the sense of the Commissions that, if control were to be imposed, it should
take the form of a "reasonableness" test,"' ° that is, an exemption clause will be
invalidated insofar as it can be shown that, in the circumstances of the case, it
would not be fair or reasonable to allow reliance on the clause.
This formulation was derived from § 3 of the Misrepresentation Act,
1967.' It was supported by five major arguments:
(1) "It would be morally and socially unjustifiable to reform the law at
the expense of a single section of the trading community,"'5 2 i.e., retailers.
England, after all, is still a nation of relatively small-scale shopkeepers, who are
not entirely capable of protecting themselves from an imposition of heavy
liability.
(2) The cost of products liability insurance bought by retailers, if generally
available, would be passed on to the consuming public. "It would be more
convenient and cheaper for insurance of this type to be carried by the manu-
146 Bill clause 4 (new § 55(8)).
147 Id. at 35.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 39.
150 Id.
151 C. 7. The section is as follows:
(3) If any agreement (whether made before or after the commencement of this Act)
contains a provision which would exclude or restrict-
(a) any liability to which a party to a contract may be subject by reason of any
misrepresentation made by him before the contract was made; or
(b) any remedy available to another party to the contract by reason of such a mis-
representation;
that provision shall be of no effect except to the extent (if any) that, in any proceedings
arising out of the contract, the court or arbitrator may allow reliance on it as being fair
and reasonable in the circumstances of the case.
The Bill places the burden of proving that reliance is unfair or unreasonable on the
party challenging the exemption clause.
152 Report, supra note 5, at 41.
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facturer who even now often insures against certain types of claims by con-
sumers."
15 3
(3) The reasonableness test involved no "revolutionary innovation":
In a number of states of the United States of America the courts, in ad-
dition to the technique of adverse construction of exemption clauses, have
developed powers of striking down such clauses by reference to considera-
tions of public policy. Moreover, under section 2-302 of the U.S. Uniform
Commercial Code, the courts in those jurisdictions which have adopted the
section have statutory power to strike down exemption clauses on the
ground of unconscionability. All the available information 54 tends to show
that this provision has not led to the chaos and uncertainty which some
commentators predicted. The argument about uncertainty which is the
mainstay of the opposition encountered in our own consultation is greatly
exaggerated. 155
This reasoning is indicative of the second stage of Anglo-American cross-fertiliza-
tion relating to the sale of goods. As noted above, the Sale of Goods Act, 1893
was the model for the Uniform Sales Act. Today the Law Commissions are care-
fully observing the operation of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Implied
Terms Bill's "fair and reasonable" test represents a step towards vesting greater
discretionary power in the courts. It is by no means certain that this foothold
will be widened into a general unconscionability doctrine, but the eyes of the
Commissions and the English courts are on the American experience.
(4) It would be inconsistent to forbid the contracting out of liability for
misrepresentation, as does the Misrepresentation Act, 1967, without imposing
a similar prohibition on exemption from the implied terms of the 1893 Act.
(5) Imposition of a general reasonableness test would "go a long way
towards bridging the gap created by the recent demotion of the doctrine [of fun-
damental breach] from a rule of law to a question of construction,"15 6 i.e, by the
Suisse Atlantique case.
The Bill at its first reading in the House of Lords contained the general
reasonableness test, supplemented by two guidelines intended to reduce the un-
certainty surrounding the "fair and reasonable" criterion: (1) regard should be
had to the buyer's knowledge, actual or constructive, of the exemption clause
and (2) availability of alternative sources of supply should be considered.
5 7
The Bill emerged from the report stage in the House of Lords with a few
minor changes and one fairly substantial alteration-inclusion of further guide-
lines for adjudging what constitutes "fair or reasonable" reliance. Potentially
most important of these is the provision calling for the court's consideration of
whether it was reasonable at the time of the contract to expect that a condition,
with which noncompliance is to trigger exemption from §§ 13-15, could be
practically met. This test limits examination of the contractual situation to the
153 Id. at 41-42.
154 This information included a study of § 2-302 written by the Working Party and in-
cluded as Appendix C to the Working Paper, supra note 67.
155 Report, supra note 5, at 42.
156 Id.




time of contracting. The report had recommended a broader frame of refer-
ence, suggesting that
where the provision excludes or restricts liability unless certain conditions
are complied with (for example, claiming within a prescribed time), [the
query should be] whether it was, in the events that have occurred, reasonably
practicable to comply with those conditions .... (Emphasis added.')"s
It is submitted that the above recommendation would have been more welcome
to small-business buyers than the clause as finally drafted, in view of the restric-
tive interpretation of "fundamental breach" announced in Suisse Atlantique. It
is important, however, to remember that the guidelines in the Bill are suggestions
only, intended to point towards the relevant issues. The limitation of the inquiry
to reasonableness at the time of contracting is thus not binding on a court 59
B. Privity of Contract
It is evident that any attempt to ensure the protection of the terms implied
by the 1893 Act into a contract for sale depends on the existence of a contract
for sale. Consequently, the attempt to impose liability for defective products in a
contractual environment will be bound in by the fence of privity. In the United
Kingdom this fence is considerably sturdier and encircles less ground than in the
United States. 6 It may well be that the stringent British privity requirement
owes much to the disastrous misinterpretations of Winterbottom v. Wright 61
exposed by Bohlen in 1905... and recognized in the leading case of Donoghue v.
Stevenson, 6 ' and the fence has been breached on occasion since; but unless a
prospective plaintiff can squeeze through the breaches or wriggle through the
slats, he is trapped. Thus the final consumer of goods bought by another cannot
sue the seller for breach of implied condition, and, mutatis mutandis, one who
buys from a retailer cannot sue the wholesaler or manufacturer on the same
grounds. The fence encloses only the immediate parties to the sale.
The Law Commissions' Working Party considered various "anomalies"
which would result in hardship by imposition of the privity requirement. A man
who takes a woman out to dinner, for example, paying the bill, can recover for
food poisoning he suffers as a result; but the woman cannot if the restaurant
had exercised reasonable care (thus barring her tort claim).6 Similarly, if a
boy buys a toy which injures him, he can recover from the seller under § 14 of
158 Report, supra note 5, at 44.
159 The test under the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302, is whether the agreement is
unconscionable at the time of contract.
160 See Earl v. Lubbok, [1905] 1 K.B. 253; Boulton v. Jones, 2 H. & N. 564, 157 Eng. Rep.
232 (Ex. 1857); Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837).
161 10 M & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
162 Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 44 Am. L. REG. (N.S.)
(209) (1905).
163 [1932] A.C. 562.
164 Buckley v. LaReserve, [1959] *C.L.Y. 1330. But see Lockett v. A. M. Charles, Ltd., [1938]
4 All E.R. 170, in which the concept of "contractual relationship" was broadened somewhat to
allow the woman's recovery in a similar situation.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
the 1893 Act, which imposes strict liability; but if his father had bought the
toy for him, the boy would have only a claim in negligence.
1 65
An end-consumer can reach the manufacturer by means of a claim in neg-
ligence.66 (occasionally involving res ipsa loquitur). He can also obtain the
equivalent of imposition of strict liability by engaging in third- or fourth-party
proceedings,' 67 based on infraction of implied warranties (a long and cumber-
some process), or he can rely on the existence of a collateral contract which
includes an express assurance of quality from the manufacturer.'6 8 These alter-
natives involve serious difficulties for a prospective plaintiff.
The Commissions noted that "the law's strict observance of the boundaries
between the fields of contractual and delictual liability can and does lead to
anomalies and hardships in individual cases."' 69 The Working Party had recom-
mended a rather revolutionary reform, proposing that
in consumer sales the benefit of the seller's obligations under §§ 12-15 of the
Sale of Goods Act 1893 should be extended to any person who may reason-
ably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods.'Y7
Such a remedy, it may be observed, would impose strict liability on retailers for
breach of implied warranty at the suit of certain users not in privity. These
users would not be forced to establish negligence. Again the Law Commissions
turned to the American experience, noting that "[t]here are important lines of
decisions in a number of states... giving extended rights to users of goods" and
that the theory of recovery in such cases is unclear as between contract, tort or a
sui generis remedy.17 ' Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code (1962
Official Text 1 72 ) was scrutinized, apparently with some favor, as it treats the
rights of end-consumers as extended contractual rights and the Commissions
desired to remain in the contractual context if possible.'
Predictably, English consumer groups supported an extension of the seller's
165 In Godley v. Perry [1960], 1 W.L.R. 9, a boy injured by a toy recovered under § 14, as
he had bought the toy himself. He was fortunate in avoiding the necessity of pleading negli-
gence, as the manufacturer was in Hong Kong.
166 Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562. Lord Atkin's remarks are of interest:
It is always a satisfaction to an English lawyer to be able to test his application of
fundamental principles of the common law by the development of the same doctrines
by the lawyers of the courts of the United States .... The mouse had emerged from
the ginger-beer bottle in the United States before it appeared in Scotland, but there
it brought a liability upon the manufacturer. Id. at 598.
167 In Kasler & Cohen v. Slavouski, [1928] 1 K.B. 78, there were five recoveries in series.
The manufacturer - last in line - paid the consumer's damages and all costs. See Dodd v.
Wilson, [1946] 2 All E.R. 691, which was extended in Young & Marten, Ltd. v. McManus
Childs, [1969] 1 A.C. 454. See also Sheftman v. Balfour Housing Corp., 37 Misc. 2d 468, 234
N.Y.S.2d 791 (1962).
168 Wells v. Buckland Sand, [1965] 2 Q.B. 170. See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.,
[1893] 1 Q.B. 256; Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932); Am'AH,
supra note 6, at 108.
169 Report, supra note 5, at 22.
170 The Law Commissions, supra note 67, para. 37.
171 Report, supra note 5, at 22.
172 The Commissions apparently did not have an opportunity to examine the revised §
2-318 (1972 Official Text; Report No. 3 of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code 13 (1967)).
173 Hence the provisional treatment of end-consumers as "third-party beneficiaries." Report,
supra note 5, at 22.
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obligation; insurers expressed reservations about the effect of placing a heavier
burden on retailers. The central issues, however, were the nature of the liability
in products liability cases and the shape of the most desirable remedy. Inevitably,
the dead forms of action made themselves felt. The conditions implied by the
1893 Act are contractual creatures, unable to slip through the slats in the fence
of privity. In contrast, the task of shaping the American consumer's remedies
has been eased by progressive relaxations of strict privity doctrine.
As early as 1852 an American court announced that a warranty of quality
can be imposed by law and does not depend on a contractual relationship' 4
Gradually breach of warranty regained much of its original delictual nature.
With the advent of strict liability for defective products" 5 and the extension of
implied warranties beyond the areas of food and drink, 7 ' American juris-
prudence presided over a marriage of strict liability and warranty theory. It was,
however, not a particularly harmonious matchY.17 Problems arose with exemp-
tion clauses, the reasonable notice requirement under U.C.C. § 2-607(3), and
wrongful death actions."8 The "illusory contract mask"17' still worn by warranty
imported various privity-related problems, including the issue of "reliance" on
the warranty on the part of one ignorant of the manufacturer's identity and the
definitions of "buyer" and "seller" under the Uniform Sales Act §§ 12-16 and
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318.80 The mask seems to have been torn
away by a series of decisions imposing strict liability for defective products,
regardless of warranty, following § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The basis of liability is tort, but the fault principle has been displaced by strict
liability.'' The necessity of the step into strict liability, in view of the possibility
of a "liberal" reading of the Uniform Commercial Code, has been questioned,"
as has been the abandonment of the fault principle in holding manufacturers
liable.' 3 Moreover, practical problems have arisen in the implementation of the
strict liability principle.
174 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). See also Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163. 317 P.2d 1094 (1957); LaHue v. Coca-Cola Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d
645, 314 P.2d 421 (1957); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d
828 (1942). Early American efforts to circumvent the privity rule-some quite creative-
are collected in Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 153-155 (1955). A
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Strict liability is not absolute liability,' and the boundary beyond which
a manufacturer can escape it is still fluid. Moreover, products can be improved
almost to the point of functional perfection but at a cost which neither con-
sumer nor manufacturer can bear. "Should the economic feasibility of improving
a product constitute the outer limit of liability?"' 18 5 A strict liability rule without
the privity requirement may in many cases result in liability by economics: the
party who can pays, regardless of his fault either vis-a-vis his codefendants or
in the absolute sense. His only fault is wealth. If he is the manufacturer, of
course, he may be in a better position to distribute the risk of liability (i.e., by
raising the price)," 6 but the cost of his protection is passed on to the public
at large.
In this respect privity provides an insurance policy. "Properly understood,
privity is only a means of protecting a party guilty of a breach against losses
suffered by remote parties which are unanticipated and therefore not included
in the calculation of costs."'8 7 The duty to provide goods of a certain quality,
however, has been imposed by operation of law as a matter of policy and does
not arise merely ex contractu; it springs from the nature of the supplier's business.
Perhaps there is some vitality in the theory of the old action on Case for breach
of warranty-the manufacturer, by holding his product out to the public, war-
rants its quality to the public at large. His liability thus arises in Case and should
not be governed by Assumpsit procedure.
The Implied Terms Bill represents a realization that the right of the parties
to alter contractually the duty of quality-the expression of the principle of
supremacy of party autonomy-must give way at least between those parties to
the overriding duty to provide a fit and merchantable product. The next step
in the diminution of the importance of the contractual aspect of products
liability is extension of benefit under this duty to third parties. The Commissions,
although sympathetic to the possibility, deferred action pending further study:
the majority [of those polled on the issue] advised against introducing a
fundamental change in the law by a side wind and urged upon us the need
for further intensive studies of the whole range of contractual and delictual
problems involved in reforming the law relating to products liability....
As however the results of the consultation have confirmed our view that
the extension of the seller's liability to certain third parties is a live issue, we
hope that as soon as practicable products liability in all its legal implica-
tions will be made a subject of a separate study. 8
Such further study might well concentrate on the provision, ubi jus, of a remedy
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for the aggrieved end-consumer, rather than focusing overmuch on the technical
theory of recovery. If there indeed is a right for the third-party end-consumer,
it is extracontractual; if it is extracontractual, it does not depend upon privity.
Should we as lawyers not open our minds to the possibility that the doctrine
of privity of contract, so beloved of the common law, is a distorting factor
in the law of consumer protection and that the contractual relationship
which exists between buyer and seller .. is a less important element than
the present structure of the law makes it out to be?5 9
To this end a new Products Liability Working Party has been established, under
the chairmanship of Aubrey L. Diamond. The Lord High Chancellor's Terms of
Reference for the Working Party are as follows:
To consider whether the existing law governing compensation for personal
injury, damage to property or any other loss caused by defective products
is adequate and to recommend what improvements, if any, in the law
are needed to ensure that additional remedies are provided and against
whom such remedies should be made available.190
IV. Conclusion
The Implied Terms Bill is a limited step towards the creation of a products
liability climate which will be more congenial to the British consumer. In con-
junction with the Bill, the Commissions' Working Paper on exclusion of liability
for negligence has made concrete proposals for prohibiting or controlling dis-
claimers of negligence liability, and a Report is awaited.
Even under the Bill, however, a seller can still show that the buyer has not
relied on his skill or judgment, or that the goods were merchantable if defects
were drawn to the attention of the buyer. In such cases, recovery in tort, if pos-
sible, is appropriate.
It would be erroneous to conclude that because the Implied Terms Bill
speaks to the buyer-seller contractual relation, further development of products
liability theory in Britain will be limited to the frame of reference of warranty.
Work proceeds apace on several fronts towards the fashioning of a single, unitary
remedy. It is conceivable that the American experience may be of some assis-
tance in this regard. Surely, although the transatlantic variations on the theme
of products liability differ melodically, they share the same key.19'
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